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I.
Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Scope
This memorandum examines the development of international aiding or abetting
jurisprudence.* The events over which the ECCC presides present unique issues
regarding making use of international aiding and abetting precedent. Though this area of
international law has seen a great deal of development since the Second World War,
much of that development occurred after the events over which the ECCC has
jurisdiction.1 Though ostensibly, direct application of aiding and abetting case law under
the ICTY and the ICTR would be ex post facto, this memorandum will argue that much
of that case law is merely a codification of international natural law principles that
existed long before the ICTY and the ICTR, and is therefore fairly and justly applicable
to the defendants under the ECCC. 2 Further, this memorandum will argue that although

* Discuss the status and development of the theory of aiding and abetting since World
War 2, under international criminal law. Discuss it's usefulness in application to cases of
individuals that do not directly commit or order the crimes but hold positions of high
level political, government or military responsibility and are aware or had reason to be
aware of the commission of the crimes by members of their government, police, army or
civil service.
1

See, The New York Times Online,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F04E0D61631F930A35752C0A9629C
8B63&st=cse&sq=khmer+rouge&scp=7 last accessed March 20th, 2008. (briefly outlines
the time period during which the Khmer Rouge reigned over Cambodia – 1975 to 1979.)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42]; See also, The ICTY Homepage,
http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm, (The International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by Security Council resolution 827. This
resolution was passed on 25 May 1993 in the face of the serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991, and as a response to the threat to international peace and security posed by those
serious violations.)
Black’s Law Dictionary 626 (8th ed. 2004). (“ex post facto law: A law that
impermissibly retroactively, esp. in a way that negatively affects a person’s rights, as by
2
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there are differences between the Nuremberg statute and the ICTY and ICTR statutes,
with respect to aiding and abetting, the courts actually applied similar standards to aiders
and abettors. By examining the process by which the ICTY and the ICTR traced the state
of the law from Nuremberg to present day, we can develop an understanding of how that
law is applicable to the ECCC.
Thus, this memorandum is broken into four over-arching sections. Section One
outlines the basic findings of the memorandum. Section Two briefly discusses some of
the factual background relevant to the discussion of aiding and abetting jurisprudence.
Section Three is broken up in to several sections. Subsection (A) examines the
state of international law prior to Democratic Kampuchea. Subsection (B) outlines the
circumstances under which a high-up government official may be held liable for aiding
and abetting the commission of international crimes despite not directly ordering the
commission of those crimes. Subsection (B) examines this question using only the law
examined more generally in Subsection (A). Subsections (C), (D) and (E) compare the
law regarding aiding and abetting under the ICTY and the ICTR to the law at Nuremberg,
and discusses the extent to which the ICTY and ICTR merely codified already
established international law, and the extent to which they created new law. Subsection
(F) Discusses how the court selects aiding or abetting or command responsibility doctrine
when they are both applicable. Subsection (G) summarizes and discusses whether a highup government official may be held liable for aiding and abetting the commission of

criminalizing an action that was legal when committed…”)[reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 41].
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international crimes despite not directly ordering the commission of those crimes under
ICTY and ICTR law.
. Subsection (H) explains why applying the law from the ICTY and the ICTR
tribunals is not ex post facto application of the law. Finally, Section Four summarizes
and concludes the memorandum.
B.

Summary of Conclusions.
i.

Most of the substantive development of international aiding
and abetting jurisprudence occurred under the Nuremberg
Tribunals

Aiding or abetting Jurisprudence under the Nuremberg Tribunals is generally vague,
but the International Military Tribunal Statute was interpreted very expansively, using
general principals of law, in order to most effectively reach the higher-up officials.
However, analysis of the case law does reveal a pattern, and the basic elements of aiding
or abetting emerge. First, the aidor or abettor must know that the principal actor intended
to commit a crime. Second, the aidor or abettor must know that his actions will assist or
encourage the principal perpetrator. Third the aidor or abettor must, substantially effect
the commission of the crime.
ii.

The ICTY, and ICTR Statutes were not formed with the
intention of creating new law.

The ICTY and ICTR Statutes were codified existing international humanitarian
law. Indeed, aiding or abetting jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR closely resembles
Nuremberg jurisprudence, and Nuremberg jurisprudence is cited heavily, especially in
early ICTY cases.
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iii.
High up government officials can be held culpable for aiding
or abetting a crime, even if they did not participate in the
crime or directly order it.
Case law provides several examples of individuals who were held guilty of aiding
or abetting a crime because they had the authority to stop or punish the principal actor,
but did not do so. Though there are a few cases that appear to reject aiding and abetting
liability in favor of superior responsibility, the court’s analysis in those cases can be
differentiated
iv.

Criminal liability can be assigned for either aiding or abetting.

The Nuremberg Tribunals did not explicitly separate aiding and abetting, but their
decisions implicitly distinguish them. The ICTR courts explicitly affirm this distinction.
v.

Application of ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence to cases under
the ECCC does not constitute an ex post facto application of
law, as ICTY and ICTR are merely codifications of existing
international law.

Because the Nuremberg tribunals interpreted the law so broadly, and because the
ICTY and ICTR courts essentially apply pre-existing humanitarian law, defendants are on
notice that their conduct was illegal according to international law.
C.

Definition of Aiding and Abetting

Before proceeding, several important terms should be discussed. Most
importantly, it is important that one understands the difference between “aiding” and
“abetting” in international jurisprudence. Though this difference is first explicitly
described under ICTR jurisprudence, various courts have implicitly differentiated
between the acts now associated with the two terms.3 Generally, “aiding” means

3

United States of America v. Friedrich Flick et al. (1947) 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1 (Nuremberg).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
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providing tangible help, either by providing funding and resources are by directly
contributing to the commission of a crime.4 “Abetting,” more typically refers to lending
general moral support and encouragement to, or inciting, the commission of a crime.5
II.

Factual Background:
“…[B]etween 1975 and 1979, as many as one-fourth of [Cambodia’s] people

[were killed.] Under the radical Communist government, Cambodia became a mass labor
camp where people were executed or died from torture, starvation, disease and
overwork.”6 The New York Times reported on January 3, 2004, that one of the Khmer
Rouge leaders, Khieu Samphan, claimed that he had no knowledge of the atrocities that
occurred during the Khmer Rouge’s reign.7 Khieu Samphan is not the first to claim
ignorance as to the commission of crimes under his authority. The Nazi’s frequently
used this defense during the Nuremberg trials.8 This memorandum therefore analyzes
how much involvement, and how much knowledge a high-up government official must
have before he can be held criminally liable for aiding or abetting a crime.
4

Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T) Judgment 2 September 1998, ¶ 484.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
5

Id, ¶ 484.

6

The New York Times Online,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F04E0D61631F930A35752C0A9629C
8B63&st=cse&sq=khmer+rouge&scp=7 last accessed March 20th, 2008. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 42]
7

The New York Times Online,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F04E0D61631F930A35752C0A9629C
8B63&st=cse&sq=khmer+rouge&scp=7 last accessed March 20th, 2008.
8

United Kingdom v. Tesch et al. (1946) I L.R.T.W.C 93, 97n (British Military Court).
(“Dr. Tesch stated that he had heard nothing and had known nothing of the human beings
being killed…with prussic acid.”)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
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III.
Legal Discussion
A.

Aiding and Abetting Law Prior to Democratic Kampuchea.

Much of the development of aiding and abetting jurisprudence in international
law occurred during the Nuremberg trials.9 The Statute of the International Military
Tribunal, which is the statute that guided some of these Nuremberg trials, did not
specifically use the words, “aiding,” and, “abetting.”10 The Statute reads in pertinent part,
“Leaders organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation, or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.” 11 Note that
while it does not mention aiding and abetting directly, it does outlaw the acts that are
typically taken to comprise engaging in aiding and abetting in present-day international
jurisprudence.12 Additionally, William A. Schabas observed that the judges presiding
over the Nuremberg Trials interpreted the statute quite liberally, and incorporated
“general principles of law,” which had the effect of broadening the meaning of the
statute.13 As a result, the tribunal interpreted the statute broadly enough to incorporate as

See discussion, infra, pages 13 – 22. (discussion of Nuremberg aiding or abetting
jurisprudence.)
9

10

Article 6(c) of the Constitution of the International Military Tribunal (1945).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
11

Article 6(c) Constitution of the International Military Tribunal (1945).

See discussion, infra, pages 13 – 16. (Discussion of Nuremberg case law, interpreting
the statute.)
12

13

Schabas, William A., Enforcing International Humanitarian law: Catching the
Accomplices. IRRC June Vol 83, pp 439, 441. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 40].
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many of the higher-up state and military officials as possible.14 In fact, Nuremberg
tribunals were unique at that time, in that they focused on punishing the complicitors
rather than the “primary perpetrators” of each crime.15
i:

U.S. v. Weis and the application “general principles of law” in
expanding the Nuremberg Statute

The case of United States v. Martin Gottfried Weis et. al illustrated and reinforced
just how expansively the Nuremberg Tribunals interpreted their statute to punish anyone
and everyone who participated in the depraved treatment of concentration camp
detainees. 16
In Weis, Martin Weis and thirty-nine other defendants were convicted of
“[W]illfully deliberately and wrongfully aid[ing], abet[ting], and participat[ing] in the
subjugation of civilian nation.” 17 Weis and his co-defendants were in charge of running
the Daschau concentration camp.18 In the Dauschau Concentration camp, prisoners were
subjected to myriad forms of inhuman treatment, including long workdays with poor
nutrition, cramped, inadequate, and disease-ridden sleeping conditions, often fatal

14

Schabas, at 440. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

15

Id.

16

United States v. Martin Gottfried Weis, et al (1945) 11 L.R.T.W.C. 5, 15 (Daschau).
(Emphatically stating that anyone involved in the concentration camp activities would be
held guilty)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34]; Schabas at
440.(Observing that the Nuremberg Tribunals tended to interpret the law broadly.)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
17

Weis, at 5. (The Charges)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

18

Id, at 12. (See: the first paragraph under “Questions of Substantive Law.”)
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medical experimentation, and torture.19 The Weis court relied heavily on language used
in the Mauthausen Case20 in rendering their judgment.21
The court finds that the circumstances, conditions and the very
nature of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, combined with any and all
of its by-camps, was of such a criminal nature as to cause every official,
governmental, military and civil, and every employee thereof, whether he
be a member of the Waffen SS, Allgemeines SS, a guard, or civilian, to be
culpably and criminally responsible.
The Court further finds that it was impossible for a governmental military
or civil official, a guard or a civilian employee of the Concentration Camp
Mauthausen, combined with any or all of its by-camps, to have been in
control of, been employed in, or present in…the aforesaid Concentration
Camp…or all of its by-camps, at any time during its operation without
having acquired a definite knowledge of the criminal practices and
activities therein existing.
The Court further finds that the irrefutable record of deaths by shooting,
gassing, hanging, regulated starvation, and other heinous methods of
killing, brought about through the deliberate conspiracy and planning of
Reich officials, either of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp… or of the
higher Nazi hierarchy was known to all of the above parties,… whether
they be political, criminal, or military.
The court therefore declares: ‘That any official, governmental, military, or
civil,... or any guard, or civil employee in any way in control of or
stationed at or engaged in the operation of [the concentration camp] is
guilty of a crime against the recognized laws, customs and practices of
civilised nations and the letter and spirit of the laws and usages of war,
and by reason thereof is to be punished.22
The Weis court thus reaffirmed the Mauthausen court’s enforcement of “the
recognized laws, customs, and practices of civilized nations…,”23 effectively increasing

19

Weis at 5-7. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

20

Id, at 15. (The Mauthesen Case is cited extensively.)

21

Id, at 8.

22

Weis, at 15. (citations omitted). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34.]

23

Id. (citations omitted).
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their reach beyond the mere words of the I.M.T Statute.24 More importantly, the Weis
court convicted Weis and his co-defendants even after finding that they could not have
been engaged in a per se common plan or conspiracy to commit a crime.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution seems to fall short of showing a
conspiracy among the accused in the strictly technical sense of the term.
There is no evidence that any two… of ever got together and agreed on a
long-term policy… then put this plan into operation.25
Despite the absence of a conspiracy, the Weis court convicted the defendants
using the following standard for what they called common plan: “(1) that there was in
force at Daschau a system to ill-treat the prisoners and commit the crimes listed in the
charges, (2) that each accused was aware of the system, (3) that each accused, by his
conduct ‘encouraged, aided and abetted or participated’ in enforcing the system.”26
Certainly, the willingness of Weis court to convict the defendants despite the fact that the
prosecution had not established that they had engaged in a per se common plan to commit
a crime demonstrates that the court was willing to consider other, less substantial forms
of secondary responsibility.27 These elements show that although the Weis court did not
conceptualize aiding and abetting as its own crime, they certainly contemplated it as one
way in which a person might participate in other crimes. Certainly these elements
indicate that aiding and abetting was one way in which one could participate in the crime

24

Article 6, Constitution of the International Military Tribunal (1945). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
25

Weis, at 14.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

26

Id, at 13.

27

Weis, at 8, (conviction); But See Weis, at 13. (No per se common plan). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
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of common design.28 The test further establishes the mens rea requirement that the aider
and abettor have knowledge that the common plan was in effect, and that they were in
some way contributing to the common plan.29
ii:

U.S. v. Flick and the Mens Rea Requirement for Aiding or
Abetting

The requirement that an aider and abettor need to have the mens rea of knowledge
was reaffirmed in the case of The United States v. Friedrich Flick et. al.30 Friedrich Flick
was the head of a conglomerate of industrial enterprises.31 He became an integral leader
for the military economy during World War Two, and was member of the official
regulatory body overseeing the coal, iron, and steel industries, which contributed to the
war effort.32 He was charged with having been “an accessory to…or ordered or
abetted…or taken a consenting part [in].” various atrocities under Control Council Law
No. 10.33 These charges were brought based on his involvement with a group called
“Friends of Himmler,”34 that provided financial aid to major branches of the Nazi

28

Weis, at 5. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

29

Id, at 13.

30

United States of America v. Friedrich Flick et al. (1947) 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1 (Nuremberg).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
31

Id, at 1.

32

Id, at 1.

33

Control Council Law No. 10. (Note also that all of the remaining Nuremberg cases
discussed in this memorandum used Control Council Law No. 10). [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
34

Flick, at 1-2.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
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Military.35 The Flick court found that Flick and his co-defendants continued to provide
financial support to the Nazi military even after it was common knowledge that much of
the Nazi military’s activity was illegal.36 The Flick court further found that this
knowledge, combined with the aid that they provided, was enough to hold them
criminally culpable.37 The Court further commented that, “[o]ne who knowingly, by his
influence and money[,] contributes to the support thereof must, under settled legal
principals, be deemed to be, if not a principal, certainly an accessory to such crimes.”38
Thus, the Flick court and the Weis court both reaffirm the mens rea, requirement
of aiding or abetting. Both courts require that the secondary actor have knowledge that
the principal actor has committed, or will commit a crime.39
Equally important though, is is the fact that the court did not require the
prosecution to demonstrate that Flick engage in both aiding and abetting.40 Rather, only
aiding in the commission of genocide was enough.41 The Flick court took great pains to
make note of the fact that, “Defendants did not approve, nor do they now condone the

35

Flick, at 1-2. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

36

Id, at 16.

37

Id, at 29 (part (c) heading).

38

Id, at 29

39

Id, at 40; Weis, at 13. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34.]

Flick, at 30 (inferred – one who does not approve of an action likely has not
encouraged it.)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
40

Id, at 30 (inferred – Flick was convicted for aiding Hitler despite being demonstrably
not supportive Hitler.)
41
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atrocities of the [Nazi military.]”42 The Court further noted that Flick had even lent aid to
the plot against Hitler’s life.43 Certainly then, reasonable analysis cannot conclude that
Flick had abetted the Nazi military. To the contrary, he had only provided aid. The court
only focuses on this differentiation under the context of mitigating punishment,44 but it is
nevertheless early evidence that aiding and abetting was really conceptualized as aiding
or abetting, which is an idea that is later codified more explicitly under ICTR
jurisprudence.45 As such, aiding and abetting shall be referred to as aiding or abetting for
the remainder of discussion.
iii:

U.S. v. Krupp and Affirming the Mens Rea Requirement for
Aiding or Abetting.

The case of United States v. Alfred Felix Alwyn Krupp et al. further explains the
mens rea requirements for aiding in early international criminal law. Krupp was an
German arms manufacturer who provided the majority of the “large caliber artillery,
armour plate and other high quality armament.” that the Nazi’s used.46 He was found not
guilty of aiding or abetting the in preparation of an illegal war effort via his position of an
arms manufacturer.47 The indictment read,

42

Flick, at 30.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

43

Id, at 30.

44

Id, at 29-30.

45

Akayesu, ¶ 484.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

46

United States of America v. Alfried Krupp et al. (1948) 9 L.R.T.W.C. 69, 72
(Nuremberg). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].
47

Id, at 70 – 71.
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[They,] through the high positions they held in the political, financial, industrial,
and economic life of Germany[,] committed Crimes against Peace by having been
principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in,
…groups,… connected with the commission of Crimes against Peace.48
The court seems to have been concerned with the fact that Krupp was not privy to
the actual plans that Hitler had made, and therefore did not knowingly prepare for an
illegal war.49 As a result, he did not have the requisite mens rea necessary to be held
liable for aiding.
iv:

The Zyklon B Case, Actus Reus, and the Lack of a “Butfor”
Requirement.

In the Zyklon B case,50 the defendants, officials of a chemical supply company
that provided the Nazi’s with the poison used in there gas chambers, were tried for
“complicity of German industrialists in the murder of interned allied civilians by means
of poison gas.”51 The prosecution’s case rested on the idea that knowingly providing a
commodity to the Nazi’s, who were using it to commit a war crime was itself a war
crime.52 The defense argued that the distributors of the Zyklon B gas did not know how it
was being put to use.53 However, the prosecution introduced evidence that the officials of

48

Krupp, at 71. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 33].

Id, at 84 – 85. (“The evidence did not show…that the alleged ‘Krupp conspiracy”
involved a concrete plan to wage aggressive war…Thus it was clear from the evidence
that the accused had not attended nor been informed about the decisions taken by
Hitler…”)
49

50

United Kingdom v. Tesch et al. (1946) 1 L.R.T.W.C 93 (British Military Court).
(Zyklon B Case.)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
51

Zyklon B., at 93.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30]

52

Id, at 94.

53

Id, at 97.
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the distribution company were scrupulous and efficient business people, and that they had
been extra careful about the shipments that went to the Nazi military.54 Based on this
information, the court ruled that said officials must have known how the gas was being
used, and thus treated them as if they did know how the gas was being used.55
At the sentencing stage, the defense counsel argued that they had not significantly
contributed to the gas chamber crimes because the Nazi’s would have effectuated the
same ends by some other means, if the defendants had not cooperated.56 The court found
that this argument did not constitute a mitigating factor, and sentenced the defendants to
death.57
The Zyklon B Case further illustrates important points. First, it illustrates that to
be guilty of aiding or abetting a crime, there need not be a butfor relationship between the
accomplice’s aiding or abetting activity and the commission of the primary crime.58
Rather, the activity need only have substantially contributed to the commission of the
crime.59 Second, it illustrated that the court is willing to impute an individual’s

54

Zyklon B., at 101. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].

55

Id, at 101. (See Part 9. Summing up for the Judge Advocate.)

56

Id., at 102.

57

Id, at 102.

58

Zyklon B., at 102. (Defense argued in mitigation of sentence that if Tesch had not
provided the chemical, another company would have. “Nevertheless…[he was]
sentenced to death by hanging… The sentence [was] confirmed and carried into
effect.”)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
Id, at 102. (By inference, if the accomplice’s activity does not need to be a sine qua
non of the crime, it must still have impacted that crime in some way.)
59
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knowledge of the principal’s activity if the evidence shows that the individual must have
known about it.60 Indeed, by comparing Krupp and Zyklon B., it can be inferred that the
court imputed knowledge to Tesch based on the fact that he should have known that the
poison gas was being put to an illegal use due to the quantity that had been purchased. By
contrast, the court could not impute knowledge to Krupp, because as far as Krupp knew,
the weapons purchased by Hitler could have been used for a completely legitimate
purpose.
B:

High Level Governmental Officials and Aiding or Abetting Under
“Pre-Killing Fields” International Law Jurisprudence.

This section specifically contemplates whether a high-up Cambodian
governmental official can be held criminal responsible for aiding or abetting a war crime
using only the principles explored in Section One.
The following legal standards are gleaned from the case material and the I.M.T.
statute, keeping in mind that Nuremberg tribunals applied the law expansively, applying
“general principles of law.”61 The high-up government official must have been involved
in, supported, or given practical aid to the principal actor to have aided or abetted the
commission of a crime.62 He must have had actual knowledge, which may be imputed by
the circumstances of his case.63 However, he need not have both aided and abetted the

60

Zyklon B., at 101. (See Part 9. Summing up for the Judge Advocate.) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
61

Schabas, at 441.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 40].

62

Weis, at 15. (citing the Mauthausen case, and describing the broad range of activity that
would be held criminally culpable.) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
63

Zyklon B, at 101. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
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commission of a crime – only one is sufficient for conviction.64 The action the official
takes need not be illegal itself, outside of being such action aiding or abetting another
crime.65 It is no defense that the crime would have been committed without the official’s
action.66
C:

Aiding or Abetting Under Current International Jurisprudence: The
ICTY

The development of international aiding or abetting jurisprudence has largely
taken the form of a “tidying up” of the law. Substantively, the aiding or abetting law has
not developed, in the sense that the law has not changed much since the Nuremberg trials.
However, there has been great development in the clarity of the law. Indeed, a look at
early cases from the ICTY, and the discussion in the U.N. Security Council regarding the
enactment of the ICTY’s statute reveals that politicians and judges alike view the law
applied by the ICTY as an extension of international humanitarian law, and the precedent
set by the Nuremberg trials.67
The statute governing the ICTY was enacted by the U.N. Security Council on
May 25, 1993, by unanimous vote. Discussion during the Security Council meeting

Flick, at 29. (Inferred – donating money itself is not a crime, but Flick was held guilty
for aiding or abetting when he donated money to a criminal enterprise.)[reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
64

65

See generally, Flick. (Note that donating money is not itself a crime.)

66

Zyklon B, at 102. [Zyklon B case reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].

67

See infra, notes 69 and 70, and accompanying text.
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reveals that the international community was very careful to codify existing international
law rather than create new law. 68 Mr. Aria, representing Venezuela, said,
My delegation recognizes… that the Tribunal, as a subsidiary organ of the
council, would not be empowered with – nor would the Council be assuming the ability to set down norms of international law or to legislate with respect to
those rights. It simply applies existing international humanitarian law.69
Thus, according to Mr. Aria, not only was the Security Council restricted to
codifying existing humanitarian law, but the Tribunal created by the Council would be
restricted to interpretation of international law only. The United States representative
expressed similar statements, when she said, “There is an echo in this chamber today.
The Nuremberg Principles have been affirmed. We have preserved the long-neglected
compact. Made by the community of civilized nations 48 years ago in San Francisco to
create the United Nations and enforce the Nuremberg Principles.”70 Thus, it appears that
the U.N. Security Council and Nuremberg tribunals drew upon the same international
jurisprudence.
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute reads, “A person who planned, instigated,
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or
68

See generally, provisional verbatim record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and
Seventeenth meeting, Reprinted in An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Morris, Scharf 1995, Transnational Publisher, Inc.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
69

Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth
meeting, Reprinted in Reprinted in An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Morris, Scharf, pp 182 1995, Transnational
Publisher, Inc. (emphasis added)
70

Madeline Albright, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred
and Seventy-fifth meeting, Reprinted in An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Morris, Scharf, pp 165, 1995, Transnational
Publisher, Inc. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
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execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be
individually, shall be individually responsible for the crime.”71 The statute differs
significantly from the I.M.T. Statute in that it took greater care to codify and clarify
international humanitarian law, but as will be discussed, the law under each of the
statutes is actually extremely similar in effect.72 Essentially, the only significant
difference is that the ICTY statute clarifies existing law in greater detail than does the
I.M.T. statute.73
i:

Tadic and Furundzija: Early ICTY Cases Finding Basic
Aiding or Abetting Law and Illustrating the Link
Between Present and Past International Jurisprudence.

The ICTY statute has been further clarified through extensive case law. One of
the most prominent cases is Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic.74 Tadic was accused of numerous
crimes, but the offenses that gave rise to aiding or abetting charges stemmed from
allegations that, he had participated in, or stood by and witnessed severe beatings, which
lead to the deaths of many prisoners at the Omarska camp.75 The Tadic court noted that
Nuremberg courts did not explicitly rely on aiding or abetting principles, but nevertheless
71

Article 7, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) (2007). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
72

See brief discussion of similarities in the case law, infra, page 40.

73

Madeline Albright, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred
and Seventy-fifth meeting, Reprinted in An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Morris, Scharf, pp 165, 1995, Transnational
Publisher, Inc. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
74

Prosecutor v. Tadic (Case No. IT-94-1-T), Judgment, 7 July 1997. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
Tadic, ¶ 207-223. (Describing the atrocities at the Omarksa camp, and some of Tadic’s
participation in beatings and torture.)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
75
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relied heavily on such cases in interpreting their own statute, and discussing the proper
legal standard.76 Indeed, the Court noted that the concept of aiding or abetting was rooted
in customary international law.77 Based on this analysis, the Court found Tadic guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting in the beating of the victims, because
there was no evidence that he had participated directly in all of the beatings.78 In
rendering this judgment, the Court was careful to point out that Tadic’s presence during
the beatings, without more, was not enough to create culpability based on aiding or
abetting the crime.79 However, his proximity to the events as they occurred, the fact that
he had participated in other beatings previously, and the fact that he had called some of
the victims by name to come out onto the floor of the hangar where the beatings took
Tadic, ¶ 674. (The most relevant sources…are the Nurnberg war crimes trials, which
resulted in several convictions for complicitous conduct. While the judgments generally
failed to discuss in detail the criteria upon which guilt was determined…a clear pattern
does develop.”) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]. Tadic, ¶ 675-693,
(The court relied heavily on several Nuremberg cases, citing the following precedent);
See, Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others (1946) 5 L.R.T.W.C. 54, 56. (British
Military Court.) (Tadic relied on this precedent, finding generally that requisite mens rea
for complicitous action is knowledge.) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
29].; Zyklon B., at 101(again Tadic relied on this precedent, finding knowledge as
necessary mens rea) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30]; Weis, at 13.
(Tadic precedent, stating that the accused must have taken some action effecting the
crime.) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 34].
76

77

Tadic, ¶ 666, (also noting several other sources of aiding and abetting jurisprudence).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]. See, Article 4(1) of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3]. and See Article III of the International
Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Apartheid. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 5]. (both are examples of material cited by Tadic to
establish that aiding or abetting is part of customary international law.)
78

Tadic, ¶ 204-239; Tadic at 735[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].

Id, ¶ 689. (“…presence a lone is not sufficient if it is an ignorant or unwilling
presence…”)
79
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place, were all taken as evidence that his presence had a significant encouraging effect on
the beatings. 80
Thus, the Tadic Case provides further evidence that the ICTY merely interprets,
but does not create or change any international jurisprudence. Further, the Court made
several important findings of law in rendering its judgment. First, the Court found that in
order to be held culpable for one’s contribution to the crime, they must have contributed
substantially.81 In other words, the individual’s actions must have had some effect on the
contribution of the crime.82 By this standard, Tadic was not held culpable merely
because of his presence at the time of the crime, but because there was also evidence that
he had participated in earlier crimes, and had called prisoners out to be beaten in such a
way as to imply his approval of the inhuman treatment that they were being subject to.
These facts gave rise to an inference that his presence had a direct and substantial impact
on the commission of the crimes.83 Generally then, this case establishes that a person can
be held culpable for abetting a war crime if he is present when a crime is committed, and
such presence contributed to, or encouraged the commission of the crime.84

Tadic, ¶ 207 – 239 (for eyewitness accounts of Tadic’s presence); Id at 211; Id at 670;
Id at 738. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
80

81

Id, ¶ 688.

82

Id, ¶ 688 (again citing the I.L.C. Draft Code and explaining what it means to be have a
substantial effect on the commission of a crime.)
83

Id, ¶ 735.

84

Id, ¶ 689.
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Second, the Court stated that presence at the scene of the crime is not a necessary
element of aiding or abetting.85 The aider or abettor need not be present at the moment of
the crime so long as he directly and substantially contributed to the crime at another
time.86 The Court noted that individuals who drove detainees to the woods to be killed,
but did not actually participate in the killings, could still be held liable for aiding or
abetting a crime, even tough they were not present when the principal offenders actually
perpetrated the crime.87
Thus, the Tadic case draws on multiple sources of international law to establish
that a person’s presence at the scene of a crime may be taken as evidence that they have
substantially supported or encouraged the commission of said crime.88 Again though,
such presence is not required to find that a person has aided or abetted the crime.89
Prosecutor v. Furundjiza is another ICTY case that outlined the link between
Nuremberg aiding or abetting jurisprudence and present-day aiding or abetting

85

Tadic, ¶ 691. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].

Id, ¶ 691. (Noting that an aider or abettor might support the crime “before, during, or
after the incident.” However, not citing an example of how defendants supported crimes
after the incident in this case.)
86

87

Id, ¶ 691.

88

Several other ICTY cases also affirm the requirement that a presence must have a
significant “legitimizing” or encouraging effect. See, Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic (Case No.
IT-98-32-T) 29 November 2002. ¶ 70.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27];
Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Mulsiu (Case No. It-03-66-T) Judgment
30 November 2005. ¶ 517. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
89

Tadic, ¶ 689. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
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jurisprudence.90 The Court held Furundjiza guilty of aiding and abetting the rape of a
woman by relying on Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.91 The
Furindzija court also made many findings of law that were consistent with Nuremberg
tribunal findings of law.92 First, the Court found that knowledge was the requisite mens
rea for aiding or abetting.93 Second, the Court found that the aider or abettor need not
have the same intent to carry out the crime as the principal perpetrator.94 Third, the Court
found that defendant’s actions must have a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime.95 Note that this is not inconsistent with other courts findings, that aiding or
abetting must “consist of practical assistance or encouragement having a substantial
influence on the commission of a crime.”96 Finally, the Court conducted an extensive

90

See discussion of Furundzija, infra, page 32. (For discussion of the facts of
Furundzija)
91

Prosecutor v. Furundzija (Case No. IT-95-17/1-T), Judgment, 10 December 1998
¶ 43-44 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
92

See infra, pages 28-29, notes 94 and 95.

93

Furundzija, ¶ 245 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].; Compare to,
Zyklon B., at 94. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].
94

Furundzija, ¶ 245[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19]; Compare to,
Flick, at 30. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
95

Furundzija, ¶ 233.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19]. (Citing the
Zyklon B case, “[T]he suggestion made in the… Zyklon B cases is that the relationship
between the acts of the accomplice and of the principal must be such that the acts of the
accomplice make a significant difference to the commission of the criminal act by the
principal. Having a role in a system without influence would not be enough to attract
criminal responsibility.)
96

Limaj, ¶ 516. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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analysis of international case law regarding the legal standards of aiding or abetting using
Nuremberg jurisprudence.97
ii.

Aleksovski, Blaskic, and Furundzija: Explaining International
Aiding or Abetting Law as Applied to Person’s in Positions of
Authority

In Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, the ICTY further affirmed that an individual in a
position of authority can be guilty of aiding or abetting the commission of a crime by
being present but not using his authority to prevent the crime.98
In the Aleksovski trial, the Court held the commander of a prison camp guilty of
aiding or abetting the mistreatment of prison detainees99 Aleksovski had participated in
the mistreatment of earlier detainees, and so his continued presence was taken as
approval of the behavior of the prison guards who were actively and presently abusing
the detainees. 100 However, the court did not find Aleksovski guilty of aiding or abetting
the abuse of detainees who were first taken off prison premises.101 The trial court reached
this decision after noting that Aleksovski had authority over the activity at the prison
camp, and was often present when soldiers selected prison camp detainees to use as

97

Furundzija, ¶ 192 – 242. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

98

Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (Case No. IT-95-14/1-T) Judgment, 25 June 1999,
¶ 64-65, (the court further explains that the rest of the factual circumstances must also be
considered, but the accused’s position of authority tended to show that his presence did
lend encouragement.) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
99

Id, ¶ 88.

100

Id, ¶ 88.

101

Id, ¶ 130
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human shields, and to generally mistreat.102 Aleksovski did not use his authority to
prevent the soldiers from using the detainees as human shields, but the court did not find
him guilty of aiding and abetting a war crime.103 In rendering its judgment, the Court
found that an aidor or abettor’s position of authority does not automatically “lead to the
conclusion that his mere presence constitutes a sign of encouragement which had a
significant effect on the perpetration of a crime.104 However, the Court noted that an
accused’s position of authority can provide some evidence that his inaction had an
encouraging effect on the commission of the crime.105
Significantly, the Appeals Court reversed the Trial Court’s ruling, holding
Aleksovski guilty of aiding and abetting the mistreatment of prison camp detainees, even
when those prisoners were not on camp premises.106 In rendering judgment, the Appeals
Court noted that there was evidence that Aleksovski had knowledge that the prisoners
were being mistreated off camp premises, and he did not exercise his authority to protect
them.107 This Appeals Court case is especially significant because it can be read
expansively to mean that a person of authority can be culpable for aiding and abetting a
crime, so long as they have knowledge that the crime is being committed and do not act

102

Alesksovski Trial, ¶ 125. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

103

Id ¶ 129.

104

Id,¶ 65.

105

Id, ¶ 65.

106

Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (Case No.: IT-95-14/1-A) Appeals Chamber 24 March 2000,
¶ 172.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
107

Id, at ¶169.
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to prevent the crime. Further, Aleksovski is a clear example of an omission significantly
effecting the commission of the crime through support or encouragement.
The Blaskic case affirms the findings of law from the Aleksovski Case. Indeed,
the Blaskic court found that Blaskic could be held guilty of aiding or abetting war crimes,
even though he did not positively order the commission of the crime.108 The Court also
found that he aided or abetted those crimes by omission, because he had responsibility to
prevent the commission of these crimes due to his position of authority, but did not do
so.109
Blaskic was commander of the Bosnian-Croat forces in central Bosnia.110 The
men under his command used captured Bosnian Muslim combatants as human shields.111
The Trial Court found that he knew that these crimes were committed, but took no action
to prevent or punish them.112 Thus, a simplified explanation of Blaskic is that, under
Article 7(1) of the ICTY statute, a person in an authoritative position can be held guilty
of aiding or abetting a war crime if he knew or had reason to know that the crime
108

Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Case No. IT-95-14-A) Appeals Chamber Judgment, 29 July
2004, ¶ 670. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].
109

Blaskic Appeal, ¶ 46-47 (If a person omission had a decisive effect on the commission
of the crime, he or she can be guilty of aiding or abetting.) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 16]. Also See generally, Blaskic Appeal 647-670.
110

Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Case No. IT-95-14-T)Judgment, 3 March 2000, ¶ 9.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
Id, ¶ 549. (“Once the HVO soldiers had taken control of the village, they took the
residents of Ga~ice (247 Muslim civilians) on a forced march towards Vitez and forced
them to sit opposite the Hotel Vitez as human shields, for about three hours”).
111

112

Id, ¶ 742 (Evidence that showed the court that Blaskic did in fact know that his men
had committed crimes, because he was he could see the people lined up outside the
building).
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occurred, and does not take reasonable steps to discover the nature of the crime, and
punish the perpetrators.113
Prosecutor v. Furundjiza is another case involving a defendant in a position of
authority. Furundzija was found guilty of aiding or abetting the rape of a Croatian
woman.114 Furundzija, the leader of a military group calling themselves “The Jokers,”
arrested a woman from Vitez.115 Furundjiza did nothing to prevent one of his soldiers
from raping the woman while Furundjiza interrogated her.116 The Court found that
because Furundjiza knew that his soldier was committing a crime, and because he had the
authority to stop the soldier but did not, his inaction legitimized and encouraged the
soldier’s actions117 Thus, he had knowingly and substantially contributed to the
perpetration of the crime of rape, meeting the requirements for aiding or abetting.118

113

Blaskic Appeal, ¶ 647-670. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].

114

Furundzija, ¶ 274, ¶ 275. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

115

Id, ¶ 39. (factual allegations).

116

Id, ¶ 41,(factual allegations), ¶ 273

117

Id, ¶ 232. (Finding that status must be such that it has a legitimizing or encouraging
effect on the principal); Id ¶ 274 (finding the accused guilty)
118

Id ¶ 273.
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iii:
Blagojevic, Use of the Articles of the Statutes, Complicity in
Genocide Versus Aiding or Abetting Genocide.
The case of Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic clarifies that the
legal standard for aiding or abetting under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute is the same as
the legal standard for aiding or abetting are Article 4(3) of the ICTY Statute. In
Balgojevic, the defense argued that complicity in genocide is different from aiding or
abetting genocide, in that complicity in genocide requires specific intent, and aiding or
abetting merely requires knowledge of the principal actor’s intent119 The Court rejected
this argument, stating that complicity is a concept that encompasses aiding or abetting,
and that aiding or abetting only requires knowledge of the principle actor’s intent.120 The
Court also found that complicity in genocide under Article 4(3) includes the “various
forms of participation listed under Article 7(1).”121 Thus, the mens rea standard for
aiding or abetting genocide under Article 4(3) and general aiding or abetting under
Article 7(1) is identical.122
iv:

Vasiljevic, Mens Rea and Group Membership.

The case of Prosecutor v. Vasilevic further establishes that the aider or abettor
must merely know that his actions will serve to support or encourage the commission of a
119

Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic (Case No. IT-02-60) Judgment, 17 January, 2005 ¶
637. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]. See also Gallagher, Katherine,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The Second Srebrenica
Trial: Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic., Leiden Journal of International
Law, 18 (2005). (for an in depth discussion of this case and aiding or abetting issues
therein.)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
120

Id, ¶ 777-779.

121

Id, ¶ 778.

122

Id, ¶ 778.
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crime, and does not need to share the principal actor’s intent to perpetrate a specific crime
to be held criminally culpable.123 However, an aider or abettor who does not share the
principal actor’s intent may be held to be less culpable than he would have been
otherwise.124 Additionally, Vasilijevic stands for the notion that an aider or abettor need
not be part of the group he aids or abets to be culpable.125
Vasiljevic served as an informant for Milan Lukic, who was an officer in a
paramilitary group. Lukic, had arrived in the Visegrad with the intent to target the NonSerb population in the area with various crimes, ranging from rape, murder and
looting.126 Vasiljevic, though not a member of Lukic’s group, provided information to
Lukic regarding the location of the Muslim population of Visegrad, knowing that Lukic
intended to commit crimes against them.127 The Vasiljevic appeals court found him
guilty of aiding or abetting the commission of war crimes despite finding that he lacked
the intent to murder the individuals.128 Thus, the Vasiljevic court’s ruling indicates that
an aider or abetter does not avoid criminal culpability because he lacked the specific
criminal intent of the principal actor, or because he was not a member of the principal
actor’s group.
123

Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic (Case No. IT-98-32-T) 29 November 2002, ¶ 71. [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
124

Id, ¶ 71.

125

Id, ¶ 59.

126

Id, ¶ 72-79.

127

Id, ¶ 59.

128

Prosecutor v Vasiljevic (Case No. IT-98-32-A) 25 Feb 2004. ¶ 135 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
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D:
Aiding or Abetting Under Current International
Jurisprudence: The ICTR
It is unsurprising that the aiding or abetting jurisprudence of the ICTR relates so
closely to that of the ICTY, as with their statutes use precisely the same language to
describe the crime.129 The ICTR statute was adopted by the U.N Security Council
Resolution 955 of November 8, 1994.130
Like the case law of the ICTY, the case law of the ICTR is striking because it
clarifies and explains international humanitarian law, but remains true to Nuremberg
jurisprudence.131 Indeed, nearly all of the case law under the ICTR produces results
entirely consistent with both the ICTY and the Nuremberg trials, providing further
evidence that the state of the substantive law has not changed much at all since the
1940’s.132
i:

Akayesu, Aiding or Abetting, Clarifying Mens Rea for
Genocide.

The case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu explicitly differentiates between aiding and
abetting, and explains that, “[E]ither aiding or abetting alone is sufficient to render the
perpetrator criminally [culpable].”133 Akayesu was held guilty of aiding and abetting

129

See, Article 2 and 6 State of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
(2007) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].; Compare to, Articles 4 and 7
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (2007).
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
The Security Council adopted the ICTR Court’s Statute in Resolution 955 of 8
November 1994. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
130

131

See, brief comparison of jurisprudence, infra, page 40.

132

Again, see comparison, infra, page 40.

133

Akayesu, ¶ 484 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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various crimes. Specifically, he encouraged the rape of various women near the
communal area of his bureau.134 He also ordered the civilians of his commune to capture
and eventually kill three Tutsi brothers, aiding in this activity by blowing his whistle to
alert the people to the brothers’ attempted escape.135 The court elaborated on the
difference between aiding and abetting:
Aiding is providing assistance to someone. Abetting… involve[s] facilitating an
action by being sympathetic thereto.136
This principle is illustrated by the Court’s ruling that he was guilty of rape as
described above.137 Indeed, it is notable that Akayesu never provided any actual
assistance to the commission of the rapes, but was nevertheless held guilty for
encouraging the rapes through his inaction.138
Prosecutor Eboe-Osuji noted that the Akayesu judgment also created some
confusion regarding the requisite mens rea for aiding or abetting specifically in genocide,
stating that the aider or abettor needed to have intended to lend aid or encouragement to
the crime of genocide.139 However, this result is inconsistent with the rest of the

134

Akayesu, ¶ 12B. (charges). [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].

135

Id, ¶ 18. (charges)

136

Id, ¶ 484.

137

138

Id, ¶ 696 - 706
Id, ¶ 12B. (charges of his activity); ¶ 416. (witness testimony).

Eboe-Osuji, Chile, ‘Complicity in Genocide’ Versus ‘Aiding and Abetting Genocide’ –
Construing the Difference In The ICTR and ICTY Statutes. Journal of International
Criminal Justice, 56, 58 (2005) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35]; citing
Akayesu, ¶ 485, 540 and 544-547. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
139
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jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, and was specifically rejected by the Semanza
judgment.140
ii:

Kayishema and Ruzindana, Semanza, and Ngeze
Affirming that Encouragement (Abetting) is Sufficient
for Guilt.

Several other ICTR cases affirm that abetting is enough for criminal
culpability.141 In Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, the court found that
Kayishema, the prefect of Kibuye, was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under Article
6(1) of the statute.142 Kayishema’s defense argued that, despite the Akayesu decision, the
offenses under Article 6(1) should be read as cumulative.143 The Court rejected the
argument and affirmed the Akayesu interpretation of separate definitions and separate
culpability for aiding and abetting.144

140

Id at, 61[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 35]; citing Prosecutor v.
Semanza (Case No. ICTR-97-20-T) Judgment 15 May 2003 ¶ 648. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
141

Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana (Case No. ICTR-95-1-T) Judgment, 21 May
1999, ¶ 201[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20]; Semanza, ¶ 386.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
142

Kayishema, ¶ 499-500.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

143

Id, ¶ 194. (Likely, this argument was made because Kayishema had clearly committed
most of the offenses listed under Article 6(1), but with a “cumulative” interpretation, his
behavior may not have risen to culpability for aiding or abetting.)
144

Id, ¶ 196. (Citing and affirming the Akayesu court.), ¶ 32-48 (Indictments for
massacres).
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In Prosecutor v. Semanza, Semanza was held guilty for abetting war crimes by
serving as an “approving spectator” of the rape and murder of Tutsi women.145 He was
found guilty despite not having physically assisted or perpetrated the crime.146
In the case of Prosecutor v. Nahimina, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, Hazzan Ngeze was
also held guilty of encouraging war crimes through publications in his newspaper.147
Ngeze’s actions can be distinguished from the three previously discussed cases because
Ngeze was not immediately present for many of the crimes that he was guilty of aiding or
abetting. Ngeze published disparaging propaganda in his newspaper, the Kangura.148
The publications incited the Hutu people to commit crimes against the Tutsi people.149
The Court found that the Kangura not only took a distinctly anti-Tutsu tone, but also
published lists of Tutsi civilians, who were subsequently killed. 150

145

Semanza, ¶ 386. (An authority figure who is present while the crime is committed and
does nothing to stop it is an “approving spectator”), ¶ 481. (Semanza encouraged a crowd
of people to rape a group of Tutsi women before murdering them.), ¶ 485 (Perpetrator,
after receiving such encouragement, raped a Tutsi woman, and killed her – thus Semanza
was guilty of instigating torture.)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
146

Semanza, ¶ 481.

147

Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hazzan Ngeze, (ICTR99-52-T) Judgment 3 December 2003, ¶ 977A, ¶ 1084. [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 18].
148

Id, ¶ 135. (establishing ownership of the Kangura).

Id, ¶ 138-139. (Delineating Ngeze’s views on the Tutsi’s, disparaging them, The “Ten
Hutu Commandments”)
149

150

Id, ¶ 152-182. (Establishing that he was not merely publishing the news, but that the
tone of his paper was actually derogatory to the Tutsi.); Ngeze, ¶ 204.
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iii.
Strugar, and Selecting Aiding or Abetting or Command
Responsibility.
The ad hoc tribunals have oscillated some on whether authorities in positions like
Blaskic and Aleksovski should be held guilty under aiding or abetting, or under command
responsibility. In Prosecutor v. Strugar, lieutenant-general Strugar was held guilty of
command responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY statute, but not for aiding or
abetting under Article 7(1) of the statute.151 The court found that Strugar had ordered the
attack that gave rise to his culpability, but was unable to establish that he had specifically
ordered the attack on the civilians residing in Old Town.152 The court cited several
reasons for not finding guilt under aiding or abetting jurisprudence. The most confusing
reason was because of the lack of settled jurisprudence on when a person in position of
authority can be held guilty for aiding or abetting by omission.153 In fact, it would appear
that several cases have clearly established the possibility of guilt for aiding or abetting by
omission.154 However, Strugar can be understood to be decided on other grounds as
well. For example, the court was not convinced that, in this case, Strugar’s failure to
investigate and punish his soldiers actually had a direct and substantial effect on the

151

Hina ,Silvek, The Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar. Leiden Journal of International Law, 19
(2006) pages, 481 – 482[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37], citing
Prosecutor v. Strugar (Case no. IT-01-42-T) Judgment, 31 January 2005, ¶ 354 – 355.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
152

Strugar, ¶ 337-338.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

153

Id ¶ 355.

154

See discussion of Blaskic, Aleksovski, Furundzija, infra at page 29.
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commission of the crime.155 Another explanation is simply that the court may exercise its
discretion in determining whether guilt should be found under aiding or abetting, or
command responsibility.156 Note though, that some decisions have indicated that aiding
or abetting culpability takes precedence over command responsibility culpability where
convictions under both theories are possible.157 In such a case an individual’s status as an
authority figure may be taken as an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing.158
E:

Generally, The ICTR Decisions Mirror ICTY Decisions and
Nuremberg Decisions.

Nuremberg, ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence are all virtually identical.159 Actus
reus standards across all three tribunals are the same.160 Mens rea standards are similarly
uniform.161 Culpability can be found based on aiding or abetting.162 Furthermore, the
assistance or encouragement does not need to be conditio sine qua non to the crime.163

155

Strugar ¶ 354-355.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

156

Hina, at 483[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37], citing, Prosecutor v.
Krnojelac (Case No. IT-97-25-T) Judgment, 15 March 2002 ¶ 173. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
157

Hina, at 483[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37]., citing, Prosecutor v.
Krstic (Case No. IT-98-33-T) Judgment, 2 August 2001 ¶ 605. [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
158

Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez (Case No. IT-98-33-A) Judgment, 17 December
2003 ¶ 34. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
See Reggio, pages 629 – 647 (Another paper tracking the development of international
aiding and abetting law) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
159

160

Furundzija, ¶ 257[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19]; Semanza, ¶ 381.
(“proof is required of causal connection…”)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 25], See also Flick at 29.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
161

Blaskic Appeal, ¶ 49[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16]; Prosecutor v.
Bagileshema (Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T) Judgment, 7 June 2001, ¶ 32 (affirming
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F:
Summary of the Findings of Law and Discussion
Current international jurisprudence establishes the culpability of a high up
government official who knew or had reason to know of the commission of crimes by
those whom they have authority over. Indeed the case law shows that if a government
official has the authority to put a halt to the commission of these crimes, he must do so,
or he is guilty of aiding or abetting the crime by omission.164 The ICTY has heard
several cases that are directly on point in this matter. 165 The Furundzija case involved a
situation wherein a military commander was in the same room as one of his soldiers
raped a woman. Indeed, Furundzija had not issued an order for the soldier to rape the
woman, however, he was found guilty of aiding and abetting because he made no move
to stop the soldier.166 The Aleksovski case involved similar facts, where the commander
of a prison camp was held guilty of aiding and abetting by omission, even though the
prisoners were taken away from his presence to be abused.167 Again, Aleksovski did not

knowledge requirement, but eventually acquitting). [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 13]; See also, Zyklon B, at 101.[reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 30].
162

Akayesu, ¶ 484[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10]; Compare to Flick
at 30 (inferred – Flick was convicted for aiding Hitler despite being demonstrably not
supportive Hitler.)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
163

Blagojevic, ¶ 726[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]; Compare to
Zyklon B at 102.[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30.]
164

See Discussion of Aleksovski, Blaskic, Furundzija, infra, page 29.

165

See Discussion of Aleksovski, Blaskic, Furundzija, infra, page 29.

166

Furundzija ¶ 273. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

167

Aleksovski, Appeal ¶ 169, 172. (Admittedly, Aleksovski had already been found guilty
of aiding or abetting of the prisoners within the prison by virtue of his presence. It is
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order the mistreatment of the prisoners out of the camp, but failed to prevent it. Finally,
the Blaskic case establishes that, not only must an authority figure take steps to prevent
his soldiers from committing crimes, but he may also .168 It is important to note that
omission alone is not enough to establish guilt under aiding or abetting. Instead, such
omission must also effectuate assistance or encouragement so as to have a significant
impact on the commission of the crime.169 Further, though Furundzija, Aleksovski, and
Blaskic all find that knowledge, authority, and inaction may be enough to find guilt via
aiding or abetting a crime, the Tadic case demonstrates that the case for aiding or abetting
culpability appears much stronger if the authority figure has ordered or participated in
crimes previously.170 That is, the Court is much more likely to find that the authority
figure substantially effected the commission of the specific crime via assistance or
encouragement, if he has previously developed an observable pattern of behavior which
generally indicates the he condones the type of actions of his subordinates.171
Several ICTR cases facilitate the findings in the ICTY cases by explaining that
either aiding or abetting a lone is sufficient for culpability, making it still easier to

unclear whether the conviction for aiding or abetting the mistreatment of the prisoners
while outside the prison relied on this fact.)[reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 12].
168

Blaskic Appeal ¶ 647-670. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16].

169

Tadic ¶ 698 (noting that acts need to lend encouragement or support, in the context of
whether presence is sufficient to show aiding or abetting.)[reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 26].
170

Id ¶ 690.

171

Id ¶ 690.
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convict. 172 The Ngeze case shows that abetting may take the form of blanket, public,
inflammatory statements.173 This is an important case because it illustrates that a person
does not necessarily need to encourage a specific crime, but can simply encourage one
group of people to unite for the purpose of rejecting another group of people
Reaching back to Nuremberg trials, the Zyklon B case gives illustration of
conviction based solely on aiding a principal perpetrator.174 It was not asserted that the
distributors of the poison gas approved of the activities at Nazi prison camps, but they
certainly provided practical aid.175
G:

Application of the Law from the ICTY and the ICTR is not Ex
Post Facto Application of the Law.

The events over which the ECCC presides ostensibly present unique challenges
regarding the use of international precedent. Indeed, because the Khmer Rouge reigned
from 1975 to 1979, but have not gone to trial until present-day, there are legitimate
questions about whether the law from the ICTY and the ICTR can fairly be applied to the
defendants under the ECCC.176
An examination of the circumstances under which the ICTY and ICTR, and their
respective statutes were created reveals that initial concerns regarding ex post facto
application of the law can be laid to rest. This is because statutes and case law of the
172

See discussion of Akayesu, Kayeishema, and Semanza infra, pages 35-37.

173

See, discussion of Ngeze, infra, notes 147-150 and accompanying text.

174

See generally, Zyklon B. (Owners of the gas distributing facility were hung, even
though there is no indication throughout the case that the owners approved of the Nazi’s
crimes.)[reproduced in accompanying note book at Tab 30.]
175

Id.
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ICTY and the ICTR are merely a codification of pre-existing international humanitarian
law.177 Indeed there are three major indicators that ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence is
actually the codification of existing international law.
First, the United Nations, who explicitly stated that the ICTY and the ICT statutes
could only restate the status of the law. Indeed, the U.N. Security council meetings
contained dialogue specifically indicating that they were careful not to create law, but
merely codify the law from Nuremberg Statute and the Geneva Conventions.178 In fact,
large portions of ICTY and ICTR statutes are pulled directly from the Geneva
Conventions. For example, Article 4 of the ICTY and Article 2 of the ICTR are verbatim
reproductions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment off the Crime of
Genocide.179 Note that the “Genocide Convention” includes the crime of complicity in
177

See Nisbet, Colin, Memorandum For the Office f the Co-Prosecutor, ECCC. To what
extent is there individual criminal responsibility for violations of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (1961) under Article 8 and 29 of the ECCC law? If liability
exists, what are the elements of such crimes?. Fall Semester, 2007. (For an extensive,
parallel argument.)[Title page and Table of Contents reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 38].
178

See, Madeline Albright, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One
Hundred and Seventy-fifth meeting, Reprinted in An Insider’s Guide to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Morris, Scharf, pp 165, 1995,
Transnational Publisher, Inc. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
179

The ICTY Statute, Article 4[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]; See
Also, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9
December 1948, Articles 2 and 3, [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2]:
“2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3. The following shall be punishable.
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genocide, which has ruled to comprise aiding or abetting as they are conceptualized under
Article 7(1) of the ICTY statute and Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute.180 Note also that the
Geneva Conventions were enacted in the late 1940’s, well before Pol Pot and his
followers committed their crimes, 181
Second, the judicial decisions under the International Military Tribunal and the
ICTY and ICTR are strikingly similar. They use the same standards of law, when holding
high-up governmental officials liable for war crimes where they can. Indeed, the extent to
which the ICTY and ICTR agree with Nuremberg jurisprudence is quite deliberate, as the
present-day courts rely heavily on precedent from Nuremberg, Dauschau, and other
courts.
Third, the individuals being tried under the ECCC are on notice that they can be
held criminally culpable for their participation in the Killing Fields in Cambodia. Indeed
under United States v. Alstotter, the court notes that the standard for avoiding ex post
facto application of the law is,
…proof before conviction that the accused knew or should have known that… he
was guilty of participation in a…system of injustice shocking to the moral sense
of mankind, and he knew or should have known that he would be [punished] if
caught.182
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.”
180

See discussion of Blagojevic and the application of the Statutes, infra, at 32.

181

For example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide was adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General
Assembly in 9 December 1948. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
182

United States of America v. Alstotter (1948) 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1 (Nuremberg), page 43.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
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Further, it does not matter that the ICTY and ICTR courts may have further
developed the case law through judicial decisions. The Alstotter court noted that, “it is
sheer absurdity to suggest that the ex post facto rule…could be applied to… a common
law decision of an international tribunal.”183 Thus, to the extent that the ad hoc tribunals
have developed the law through judicial decisions, the ex post facto principle does not
prevent those decisions from being applied to the ECCC.
In a sense, there has been no development of international aiding or abetting
jurisprudence. There has been virtually no change in the substantive law. To the extent
that there has been development in this area, it has been in the form of “tidying up” the
law, so that it is easier, and more efficient to discuss.
Further, through the Nuremberg Tribunal’s expansive interpretation and
application of international law, the defendants under the ECCC are effectively put on
notice, that the trend in international humanitarian law is to hold high-up governmental
officials responsible for any atrocities that committed, and that they could control.
In conclusion, the law under the ICTY and ICTR is still highly instructive in
interpreting the state on international law in the mid-1970’s, because it is firmly rooted in
past international humanitarian law.
IV:

Summary and Conclusions
Despite the vague nature of international law in early international courts, it has

now achieved great clarity with regard to aiding or abetting jurisprudence. The basic
elements of aiding or abetting are clear. The aider or abettor must knowingly provide aid

183

Alstotter, at 41. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
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or encouragement to the principal actor, whom he knows intends to commit a crime.
Such aid or encouragement must substantially effect the commission of he crime in the
sense that it must have an impact on the way the crime is committed. Note though, that
the aid or encouragement need not be sine qua non to the commission of the crime.
Further, either aiding or abetting alone is sufficient to find criminal culpability. A
person who provides disapproving aid, or a person who communicates his moral support
of the principal’s activity without actually aiding the principal are both still guilty of
aiding, or abetting respectively.
Aiding or abetting does not depend on the accessory actor and the principal actor
both be part of the same group, and the accessory actor does not need to be present when
the principal actor commits the crime.
The ad hoc tribunals further developed aiding or abetting jurisprudence, clarifying
the required degree of involvement required to hold an authority figure guilty of aiding or
abetting. When such an authority figure could have, but did not use his position to
prevent or punish a crime committed someone beneath him, he can be held guilty for
aiding or abetting. He need not have specifically ordered the crime, so long as his
omission satisfies the basic requirements of aiding or abetting.
The courts have differed some on whether it is more appropriate to use aiding or
abetting liability or command responsibility liability where they are both applicable, but
generally speaking, the trend has been for aiding or abetting liability to incorporate
command responsibility liability.
Finally, the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals is applicable to the ECCC
because it does not violate the ex post facto principle. This is because the defendants
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under the ECCC were on notice that what their conduct violated international
humanitarian law, and because the ad hoc tribunals merely codified existing international
humanitarian law.
Thus, the aiding or abetting jurisprudence that is applicable to defendants under
the ECCC is truly reminiscent of the phrase, “the long arm of the law.” To the extent that
any authority figure knowingly involved himself with events surrounding the Killing
Fields, or any of the other crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge regime, the law
clearly holds him criminally culpable.
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